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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST~\TE OF UTi\H, in the interest of: 
CARL EVERETT LINDH, 




BRIEF O·F AP·P·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from an order made by the Fifth Ju-
venile District Court for Grand County, State of Utah, 
on June 28, 1960, committing the appellant to the State 
Industrial School. 
The Record on Appeal consists of the entire file of 
the Juvenile Court in said matter. The proceedings be-
fore said Court were not transcribed. Said file discloses 
that Appellant appeared before said Juvenile Court on 
six separate occasions over a period extending from 
December 10, 1958, to June 28, 1960. At the time of the 
first hearing, a probation agreement in regular form was 
signed by the child, his parents, and the Court officers. 
Probation 'Yas continued at each hearing thereafter and 
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custody remained with the parents until the final hearing 
on June 28, 1960, when commitment occurred. At the 
fifth hearing, on June 16, 1960, the Court found appellant 
to be a delinquent child and ordered 
"the child be committed to the State Industrial 
School, but suspended on condition that said boy 
does not get into further trouble and lives up to all 
terms and conditions of his probation, and that his 
probation be continued." 
On June 22, 1960, Summons and Notice to Parent was 
issued preparatory to the hearing on June 28. Said Sum-
mons and Notice set forth certain alleged violations of 
law by appellant followed by the statement 
''that by reason of the foregoing, the said child 
did violate the terms and conditions of his pro-
bation order and agreement with this Court.'' 
X o express notice 'vas contained in said Summons and 
l\ otice for the parents to sho'v cause 'vhy the suspension 
of the commitment to the Industrial School should not be 
revoked, or that such action 'vould be considered at said 
hearing. 
Said Summons and Notice 'vas serYed upon William 
Droc~gemcier, the stepfather, on June 24, 1960, and both 
hP and the child's mother, l\iildred Droegemeier, ap-
pPnred at the hcHring on June ~8th .... A .. t the conclusion of 
said hearing, the Court made the follo,ving order: 
"1. That the aboYe named child be and is hereby 
t.h'elared delinquent. 
2. Thn t in the best interest of said child, subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of this Court, he be 
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and is here by : the Court finds the said child has 
violated the terms and conditions of his Probation 
Agreement and that suspension of the commitment 
be refused and that the suspension of Court upon 
the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh to the In-
dustrial School hereto made is hereby refused and 
that the Raitl child is ordered commited to the State 
Industrial School forthwith until he is 21 years of 
age unless sooner released.'' (Emphasis added) 
At none of the proceedings before said Juvenile 
Court was appellant or his parents represented by legal 
counsel. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT 1 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
HEARING TO BE HELD ON JUNE 28, 1960, WAS 
NOT GIVEN AND THE COURT CONSEQUENTLY 
LACKED POWER TO REVOKE THE SUSPEN-
SION OF THE COMMITMENT TO THE INDUS-
TRIAL SCHOOL AND SAID COMMITMENT IS 
THEREFORE VOID. 
PoiNT 2 
THE ORDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT IN 
THE DECREE DATED JUNE 28, 1960, IS SO 




ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
HEARING TO BE HELD ON JUNE 28, 1960, WAS 
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NOT GIVEN AND THE COURT CONSEQUENTLY 
LACKED POWER TO REVOKE THE SUSPEN-
SION OF THE COMMITMENT TO THE INDUS-
TRIAL SCHOOL AND SAID COMMITMENT IS 
THEREFORE VOID. 
At the hearing on June 16, 1960, the Court found the 
boy to be a delinquent child and ordered him committed 
to the State Industrial School, but then suspended the 
execution of said order and continued the probation, leaY-
ing the boy in the custody of his parents. The Summons 
and Notice to Parent subsequently served on June 24, 
while listing alleged violations of law and making a gen-
eral allegation that the child had Yiolated the terms and 
conditions of his probation agreement, did not contain any 
notice or statement to the effect that revocation of the 
suspension order ·w .. ould be considered at the hearing on 
June 28. The parents had no notice that such revocation 
would be an issue and consequently \Yere denied the 
opportunity to prepare to meet same and have their ''day 
in court.'' 
Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of Utah pro-
vides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of la\Y. This right applies 
to juvenile as \\'"ell as to ciYil and criminal proceedings. 
rrhe Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen Y. Harris, 109 
Utah 1, 163 P. 2d 31-! (19-!3) at page 317 lists the mini-
mum essentials of ''due process'' in depri,Ting a person 
of liberty and among them states: 
'' ( r) notice to the person of the inauguration and 
purpose of the 1:nquiry and the time at \Vhich such 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
person should appear if he wishes to be heard'' ; 
(Emphasis added) 
It is submitted that in the case at hand notice of the 
purpose of the inquiry was not given in such manner as 
to clearly apprise the participants that revocation of the 
~n8pension order "\vould be considered at the hearing. 
In State v. Bonza,, 106 Utah 63, 150 P. 2d 970 (1944), 
the Utah Court \Vas again called upon to determine what 
constitutes "due process" in a revocation of probation 
case. The Court stated at page 972 as follows: 
"A defendant out of prison on probation is ac-
corded due process of law by the following steps 
... : (1) The filing of a verified statement or an 
affidavit in the case setting forth facts which show 
a violation of the terms of pro ba.tion. ( 2) The 
issuance of a;n order to show caruse and citation 
thereon requiring the defenda.nt to appear and 
show ca.use why probation should not be revoked, 
apprising defendant of the ground or grounds on 
''Thich revocation is sought, and specifying a 
proper time for hearing. (3) A hearing before the 
court on the question of violation of some term or 
condition of probation, at which the defendant 
has the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses 
against him and also to present evidence to refute 
the claimed violation of the conditions of proba-
tion. ( 4) A determination of the question, followed 
by entry of an appropriate order." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is submitted that in the case at hand no notice to show 
cause \Yhy the order suspending commitment should not 
be revoked was given or notice otherwise stating that 
such action might be taken at said hearing. 
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Although not mentioning "due process of law" or 
other constitutional guaranties, State v. Zolontakis, 70 
Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927), is an authoritative Utah 
case holding that due notice and hearing are essentials 
to revocation of suspension of sentence or probation, at 
least in a fact situation paralleling that in the instant case. 
In the Zolantakis case the defendant's sentence to the 
state prison was suspended ''during the good behavior of 
the defendant.'' Thereafter a citation was issued requir-
ing the defendant to appear at a time certain and show 
cause why the suspended sentence should not be vacated 
and set aside. Said citation was returned unserved, but 
he was subsequently picked up on a bench warrant. While 
in custody a new citation to show cause why the suspended 
sentence should not be vacated was issued. Both citations 
and the bench warrant were issued without an}'" affidavit, 
complaint, or other instrument being made or filed charg-
ing defendant " ... ith any lack of good behavior. At the 
hearing the suspension of sentence was set aside and de-
fendant was imprisoned. On appeal the Court reversed, 
holding that a person having receiYed a suspended sen-
tence during good behavior had a Yested right to rei~ ... 
thereon and is entitled to a hearing according to "well 
recognized and established rules of judicial procedure'' 
upon the question of whether or not he has complied with 
the conditions imposed. In amplification of what is meant 
by ''well recognized and established rules of judicial pro-
cedure," the Court said at page 1047: 
"that defendant is entitled to haYe filed either an 
affidavit, motion, or other written pleading setting 
forth the facts relied upon for a revocation of the 
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~uspension of sentence; that the defendant should 
be given an opportunity to answer or plead to the 
charge made; that a hearing should be had upon 
the issues joined; and that the defendant as well 
as the state be given the right of cross-examina-
tion. If we are correct in our conclusion that the 
defendant has a vested right to his personal liberty 
during good behavior when so ordered without 
reservation in the original sentence, any proceed-
ing failing in these essentials is error.'' 
Implicit in the requirement that notice be given of the 
facts relied upon for a revocation of the suspension of sen-
tence is the requirement that notice be given that such 
revocation shall be the subject of inquiry at said hearing. 
Such notice "Tas not given in the case at hand, and as a 
consequence appellant's opportunity to defend or present 
evidence in his behalf was severely curtailed. 
A case holding that an order made by a Juvenile 
Court based upon evidence presented in a hearing but 
"Thich order was not within the scope of the notice given 
for the purpose of the hearing is In. Re Olsen, 113 Utah 
365, 180 P. 2d 210 (1947). In this case a petition was filed 
alleging a child to be dependent and neglected. Summons 
\Yas served on the father who appeared at the hearing 
\\'"ith counsel and sought custody of the child. The Court 
ruled the father had neglected the child and awarded cus-
tody to a third party, and ordered the father to pay $30.00 
monthly for the support of the child. On appeal the Su-
preme Court reversed the order as to support even though 
testimony was given indicating that he had the ability to 
make such payment for the reason that no notice was 
given in the summons that the court might inquire into his 
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ability to support or make such an order. The Court said 
at page 216: 
''In this case appellant was given no notice that 
the court would inquire into his present ability 
to support the child or to contribute something to 
her support. Apparently, the order made was 
based upon evidence which was presented inciden-
tal to neglect. No doubt the summons might have 
included such notice of inquiry and a statement 
that the court might enter some order requiring 
the father to support his daughter, but failure to 
give such notice in effect deprived appellarnt of his 
day in court on that issue. There should have been 
some petition or other form of pleading to outline 
the scope of the inquiry on the matter." (Empha-
sis added) 
It might be argued in the instant case that the fact 
that the Summons and Notice served on the parents al-
leged that the child violated the terms and conditions 
of his probation order and agreement with the court by 
inference gave notice that the court would make inquiry 
into the question of revocation of the order suspending 
commitment. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
said court "~as dealing 'Yith lay people "ithout training 
in the la'v or particular knowledge or understanding of 
legal language or procedures and who were not at any 
time during said proceedings represented by counsel, 
and as such could not reasonably be expected to make 
such an inference or receive such an understanding from 
the language used. Also several Summons and Notices 
had been issued and served in connection with the prior 
hearings, containing the allegation that the child had vio-
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lated the terms and conditions of his probation, but in 
paeh instance probation was continued and insofar as the 
r<.\eord reveals, commitment to the State Industrial School 
\vas not a factor or consideration. Where such circum-
~tances prevail the Court assuredly has an additional 
responsibility to see to it that such language is used in 
its notices as is necessary to convey to the ordinary per-
son with clarity and certainty the information to be given. 
It is not to be assumed from the record in this matter that 
the parents to whom the Summons and Notice was di-
rected, in the absence of clear and unambiguous language 
so stating, understood that the court might take the kind 
of action which it did at said hearing. 
PoiNT 2 
THE ORDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT IN 
THE DECREE DATED JUNE 28, 1960, IS SO 
INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE 
UNENFORCEABLE. 
The Decree by which appellant was committed to the 
Industrial School reads as follows: 
"1. That the above named child be and is here-
by declared delinquent. 
'' 2. That in the best interest of said child, sub-
ject to the continuing jurisdiction of this Court, 
he be and is here by: the Court :finds the said child 
has violated the terms and conditions of his Pro-
bation Agreement and that suspension of the com-
mitment be refused and that the suspension of 
Court upon the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh 
to the Industrial School hereto made is hereby re-
fused and that the said child is ordered committed 
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to the State Industrial School forthwith until he 
is 21 years of age unless sooner released.'' (Em-
basis added) 
It is submitted that the provision ''that suspension of 
the commitment be refused and that the suspension of 
court upon the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh to the 
Industrial School hereto made is hereby refused" is 
ambiguous, indefinite, uncertain, and not susceptible of 
clear and concise meaning and is therefore without force 
or effect. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Juvenile Court 
did not give adequate notice that it would make inquiry 
into the question of revocation of the order suspending 
commitment at the time set for hearing, that by reason 
of said omission the Court failed to observe ''due process 
of law'' and consequently lacked power or jurisdiction 
to make such an order and that the commitment of appel-
lant to the State Industrial School is therefore invalid and 
he should be released. 
Or if such order be deemed to be 'vithin the power 
of said court to make in said circumstances, the actual 
order made is so indefinite and uncertain by its terms as 
to be unenforceable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANDSEN AND !~ELLER 
By DAN c. KELLER 
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